



UNITED NATIONS

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL



Distr.: GENERAL

E/ECA/CM.16/6

9 April 1990

Original: ENGLISH

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

Eleventh Meeting of the Technical
Preparatory Committee of the
Whole

Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
5 - 12 May 1990

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

Twenty-fifth session of the Commission/
sixteenth meeting of the Conference
of Ministers

Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
15 - 19 May 1990

LC/NAIKUBI.

TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA ISSUES AND CONCERNS
FOR IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS

by

THE UNITED NATIONS INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON
DN-PAAERD

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The effectiveness of technical co-operation is now recognized as an important element to complement countries' development efforts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, given the very thin human resources base in many African countries. Relative to the demands placed on these economies, technical co-operation has a significant role to play in building Africa's institutional, policy and management capacities. However, there is growing concern that this type of co-operation has so far not helped create the capacities considered essential for sustained economic and social development in Africa. Because of this, African governments and donors in recent years have concentrated attention on analyzing the way technical co-operation is provided and used. There exists a consensus, expressed in various ways, that improvements ought to be sought.

A. Objectives

2. In response to this problem, the primary purpose of this document is to outline issues and concerns in order to lead to formulation of an agenda for action in the area of technical co-operation with a view to the follow-up to the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) in the short term. It is intended to lend support to actions by donors to improve its effectiveness. In the long term, the goal would be to see levels of its utilization reduced and its composition changed in favour of actions that enhance local capacities, such as training and long-term institutional support, and the use of local consultants. During the 1990s, it is expected that the effectiveness of it in aid programmes will emerge as one of the central themes on the development agenda for sub-Saharan Africa.

B. Background

3. This document was prepared at the request of the ninth meeting of the UN-PAAERD inter-agency Task Force.¹ The draft of this document was reviewed by the tenth meeting of the Task Force, held in Paris from 9 to 11 January 1989, and comments by the Task Force members have been incorporated in this final version. The meeting also decided that the document would be presented to the May 1989 meeting of the ECA Conference of Ministers. It reflects the experiences of UNDP

¹ See report of the ninth meeting of the Task Force, Paris, 4 and 5 May 1988, page 23. At this meeting, three papers, one each by UNDP, the World Bank and CAC/OECD were discussed. These papers form the background for this summary. For purposes of this document technical co-operation refers to development assistance by way of advisers, consulting services, training, fellowships, etc., both as part of capital projects as well as stand-alone or free-standing efforts, using the definition commonly used by UN.

and the World Bank, as the two main instruments of technical co-operation within the United Nations family, as well as the experiences of UNCTAD, UN and other executing agencies. ECA, as coordinator to the Task Force, was entrusted with the task of submitting the document to the policy organs of ECA and the OAU so that the African countries, members who participated in these meetings can indicate their support for changes to the manner in which technical co-operation is provided and used. It is also intended that the document will contribute to the OAU membership's continuing consideration of how to improve the technical co-operation process and the preparation of guidelines to be issued by OAU for this purpose.

4. The document draws upon various sources. First, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD held two meetings in November 1987 and 1988 concerning technical co-operation. This led to informal conclusions concerning how to improve the design and implementation of technical co-operation. More recently, the West African Development Foundation (WADF), in collaboration with UNCTAD, sponsored a regional meeting in Senegal in October 1989, to get reactions to the interim conclusions from participants from 20 regional countries including 17 from sub-Saharan Africa, and 12 policy organizations. The discussions at this meeting and the views expressed are given consideration in the document. In addition, in November/December 1989, OAU convened four cluster meetings of African Ministers of Planning. The consolidated report of these meetings presents the Ministers' views on several issues of technical co-operation and these are also drawn on in this report.⁴ Finally, the discussion of this and earlier versions of the draft report and representatives of the various United Nations specialized agencies, who attended the initial and second meetings of the UN-ECA-ECI Inter-agency Task Force, have provided valuable insights from their perspective on the problems affecting it and on ways for improvement.

3. Nature of the problem

5. All of these deliberations are underlain by their criticism of it and the need for improvement. Concern about the effectiveness of IC has been building throughout the 1980s and there have been numerous occasions when both donors and recipients have reviewed its experiences. Several recent studies, including the document's background studies, and others listed in annex I, have examined its effectiveness and pinpointed the inadequacies of it in creating and nurturing local institutions. The sheer magnitude of its funding - at least US \$1 billion dispensed each year for sub-Saharan Africa - means that it is not negligible in coping to grapple with Africa's current economic difficulties.

6. Indeed, the experiences of the past three decades of development assistance have engendered an impression - not proven in empirical terms - that the reliance on IC may be counter-productive. Paradoxically, some of the assistance provided by donors to strengthen capacities may not build sound institutions, as

⁴ UNDP, Regional Bureau for Africa, Cluster Meetings of African Ministers of Planning, consolidated report of the meetings, published 1989, see pages 20-31.

originally intended, but may create distortions and undermine indigenous efforts to develop local capacities. Yet, there remain valid reasons for IC as a significant part of overall assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. While few alternatives may be immediately available - it will take considerable time and effort to build adequate capacity - more judicious use of IC, greater awareness and understanding of its effectiveness and the potential for misuse are needed by all concerned. Moreover, a long-term vision of capacity building is required for Africa in order to ensure that IC contributes to the development of local institutions.³

II. TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS

A. Magnitude of technical co-operation

7. Examining IC is difficult and falls quite short of any degree of accuracy. There is a lack of a single data base that includes data on all IC, and which is presented on the basis of coherent definitions. The annual Development Co-operation Report, published by the Chairman of DAC, provides data on aid flows from its 17 donor member countries and also includes data from multilateral and some other sources. However, while probably representing the bulk of such assistance, some provided by other sources is not included. Other information, such as data from the annual Development Co-operation Reports prepared on a country-by-country basis by UNDP, varies in terms of the availability of donor data. Statistics suffer from the need to often convert data from a donor's particular fiscal year basis to a calendar year basis. Definitions used in establishing data bases also vary. The effect of these factors is to make it difficult to establish with any degree of certainty the magnitude of total assistance provided and the amount received by particular countries. The same factors make it difficult to separate accurately IC from other forms of assistance. Both the DAC and UNDP are seeking improvements in this area but, for the present time, it must be understood that any quantitative examination and analysis of IC rests on less than a firm base.

8. As shown in annex II, available OECD statistics⁴ estimate disbursement of IC grants to sub-Saharan Africa at about \$US 3 billion per year in 1987. This is an increase of 10 per cent over the 1986 figure and a 50 per cent increase over the level reported in 1984. These amounts exclude IC which is part of capital assistance (investment projects), volunteers, NGOs and government-financed IC. Not only is a significant portion of IC not included in these statistics, official figures are likely to underestimate actual amounts: data collected by UNDP at the country level indicate that actual levels of IC disbursements tend to be much higher than reported OECD figures - some times by

³ See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-term Perspective Study (1989).

⁴ These statistics include data from the 17 donor country members of OECD.

a factor of two.⁵ The amount of \$US 3 billion, therefore, very likely underestimates the current volume of TC that is provided to sub-Saharan Africa by a wide margin.

9. Even this low estimate is staggering. Put into perspective, the current level of TC to sub-Saharan Africa is equivalent to about 25 per cent of annual net ODA disbursements. This is roughly twice as great as the total net flows from the World Bank on its own and 10 times as great as UNDP's assistance to Africa. As evident from the data presented below, the impact on many of the small countries in sub-Saharan Africa is particularly significant while the larger countries - notably Nigeria - seem to be less touched by TC.

10. When analyzed on the basis of population and public expenditures on other development activities, the amount spent on TC becomes even more pronounced. On average, based on DAC and UNDP statistics, at least \$US 6 per capita is spent on TC in sub-Saharan Africa each year. (Not weighted by population, TC is an average of \$US 19 per capita across 43 African countries, with a median amount of about \$US 12 per capita in 1987). This compares to average central government expenditures in that same year of about \$US 9 to 10 per capita on education and about \$US 2 to 3 per capita on health by African Governments. In some cases, the amount per capita is exceedingly large - for example, the figures for small countries like Cape Verde and Seychelles are over \$US 90 per capita - while in Nigeria the amount is only \$US 0.50 per capita.

11. Although there are no accurate statistics on the number of persons involved, one recent study⁶ puts the total number of advisers and consultants financed under TC programmes in sub-Saharan Africa at 80,000 non-nationals. This is roughly equivalent to the 70,000 high-level sub-Saharan Africans who are thought to be settled in EEC countries. Migration of highly skilled manpower out of Africa in the period 1985-1987 is estimated to have increased to about 23,000 per year. While TC does not necessarily offset the out-migration of skilled Africans, these figures demonstrate that there is a significant imbalance between the potential employment of highly qualified Africans in their home countries and their actual utilization. The high levels of TC may, in part, be a result of this imbalance.

⁵ These data are collected as part of NATCAPs and/or preparation of annual Development Co-operation Reports at the country level.

⁶ Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Technical Assistance Personnel Financed by the Nordic Countries, by Kim Forss, *et al.*; a study commissioned by DANIDA, FINNIDA, MCD/NORAD and SIDA, March 1988.

B. Geographic and sectoral distribution ⁷

12. The available data on IC disbursements show certain geographic and demographic features. As noted above, African countries with small populations - such as Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Comoros - receive the largest amount of IC on a per capita basis while large countries such as Nigeria and Ethiopia receive relatively low amounts of IC per capita. Significant programmes (over \$US 100 million per year) exist in Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaïre and Zambia, with the single largest programme in the United Republic of Tanzania at over \$US 180 million in 1987. Ethiopia was second with \$US 146 million in 1987. Yet, there does not seem to be a strong correlation with income levels: that is, lower income countries do not receive commensurately more IC per capita than richer countries. In terms of sectoral distribution, IC tends to be heavily concentrated in agriculture, education and health although the share of health is not as high as might be expected given the priority that this sector is accorded in most development programmes. The majority of African countries had at least half of their IC in these three sectors. The next most significant area is transport and communications. Overall, industry seems to receive very little IC.

C. IC and recipient economies

13. In some countries, IC accounts for a very significant share of total official development assistance received. While the average for the region as a whole is 25 per cent of net ODA flows, the range is considerable - from 10 per cent in Zimbabwe and 11 per cent in Uganda and Mozambique to 43 per cent in Swaziland and Gabon and a high of 66 per cent in Benin and followed by 69 per cent in Nigeria (largely because Nigeria receives very little ODA for other purposes). In Gabon, Swaziland, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cameroon, Seychelles, Comoros and Lesotho, IC as a percentage of total aid ranged from 35 to 44 per cent. For 10 countries, there was a significant increase of IC as a portion of total aid between 1984 and 1987 (Benin, Chad, Comoros, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe).

14. IC can also constitute an important element of the affected local economies. In 1987, there were at least 14 countries that had IC flows equivalent to more than 5 per cent of GNP; 23 countries between 2 and 5 per cent; and 12 countries with less than 2 per cent. Again, small countries are most affected. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, IC was a high of 23 per cent of GNP, followed by Cape Verde at 16 per cent and the Gambia at 10 per cent.

15. In terms of government expenditure, there are instances of extreme dependence: in Chad, for example IC was the equivalent of 64 per cent of total budget expenditures and in Burkina Faso, 45 per cent. On the other hand, IC was

⁷ The data in this section are based on annex II, which is drawn from the UNDP report cited in footnote 6.

the equivalent of only 3 to 4 per cent of total budget expenditures in the case of Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon and it was from 5 to 6 per cent in Ghana, Senegal and Kenya. In Nigeria, in particular, IC is a negligible share of the economy and government expenditures.

16. Nature of IC provided

16. Available statistics do not break down total IC from all sources into its component parts and IC is, therefore, not possible to analyse the nature of IC provided in global terms. Most IC entails a combination of long-term resident advisers, short-term consultants, studies, training (seminars, study tours and fellowships) plus minor amounts of equipment (vehicles, computers and office equipment). Few IC programmes include operating funds for the beneficiary agencies. Based on field experience, it is likely that the majority of IC is in the form of long-term resident advisers more than short-term consultants. Relatively few of these advisers are thought to be from developing countries (under south-south programmes). The use of local consultants is similarly relatively low but growing.

17. Some detailed information on the make-up of UNDP's and the World Bank's IC activities is available. An examination of these experiences show that the composition of IC programmes may be evolving. In the case of UNDP, just over half of its IC was in the form of long-term experts, with the share of these long-term advisers dropping slightly between UNDP's third and fourth programming cycles. Roughly two-thirds of UNDP's total IC is for advisory services (both long and short term). Formal training accounted for about 10 per cent of UNDP's assistance to Africa in 1983 but is projected to increase to about 14 per cent for the 1987-1991 period. However, the primary feature of IC is the transfer of skills which is ensured through on-the-job training. In the case of the World Bank, about 60 per cent of the total IC financed under World Bank projects in the past two years (based on approvals) was for experts and advisers, only a part of which is long term in nature. The ratio of short-term consultants to long-term advisers in a selected number of projects where data on person-months were available was 2.4:1, indicating that the vast majority of funds provided by the World Bank for IC is of a short-term nature. Training accounts for about 20 to 25 per cent, with the balance for specialized engineering and technical studies.

18. Another significant feature of IC, particularly of those programmes financed and executed through the United Nations development system, is the traditional tripartite nature inherent in collaboration among recipient government, agency of execution, usually one of specialized/executing agencies of the United Nations and UNDP, providing the source of financing. As the nature of IC changes with greater use of national execution, the tripartite relationship will require modification with respect to the various roles of the parties.

19. A significant issue is the share of IC funds utilized for training. As noted above, that share has been between 20 and 25 per cent of the total for the Bank and 10 and 15 per cent for UNDP. UNDP's efforts amount to about \$US 40 million spent on training in 1983 while the World Bank has approved some \$US 60 million each year for training in the African region. Yet, this is low compared

to other regions: in the case of Asia, for example, as much as 45 per cent of the World Bank's financing of IC is for training. Another important development in the case of Africa is the fact that an increasing portion of training funds finance programmes at local and regional training institutions plus study tours, mainly in other developing countries, as a complement to long-term fellowships often in developed countries. In terms of cost effectiveness, it is estimated that the former type of training could cost one-tenth the amount per trainee as compared to typical overseas fellowships.

III. ISSUES AND CONCERNS

20. This document is not intended to reiterate the conclusions of previous reports on the effectiveness of IC but to highlight the most important concerns for the attention of policy makers in Africa and their donor partners. It is important that, in this age of austerity and cost consciousness on the part of donors and African Governments alike, African Governments seized the opportunity offered by the initiatives being taken by donors at the level of DAC/OECD and the follow-up to the UN-PAAERD to voice their concerns - IC has simply become too important to ignore. Not only are the direct costs of IC considerable, but also the hidden costs of ineffective IC are many times more significant.

21. As elaborated in more detail in the reviews carried out by UNDP, the Bank and other donors, there are a number of issues confronting IC programmes from both the side of the donors and the side of the recipients. Many of these issues concern complex socio-political, cultural and even psychological factors that are hard to isolate and to control, compounding the difficulties of designing and managing IC programmes. It is important to remember that IC can be effective: past reviews have shown that there are a number of key elements for successful IC, such as strong client commitment, appropriate institutional development design, competent staffing and an enabling environment to ensure sustainability. To the extent that these elements are missing in current IC programmes, the likelihood of success is reduced.

A. Quality of technical co-operation programmes

22. One of the most fundamental issues affecting IC is the overall quality of these programmes. There are a number of specific concerns, starting with the lack of a strategic vision for these programmes and definition of what they are intended to achieve. The objectives of these efforts are often not clear: the institutional development goals supported by IC are difficult to define and, subsequently, to monitor and evaluate. Because of these difficulties, long-term goals are frequently sidestepped by donors and beneficiaries, with attention focusing on gap filling and substitution in order to achieve the successful physical implementation of development projects. Objectives, moreover, can often come in conflict and, when a choice is to be made between objectives, the long-term IC objectives tend to be sacrificed.

23. Thus, IC projects all too frequently fail to realize their objectives and have limited impact. This results from inadequate project preparation and design, and lack of careful and realistic definition of objectives. As perceived

by many recipients - a self-criticism shared by some donors - donor agencies are often seen not to apply as rigorous criteria to IC projects as to capital investment projects. This lack of rigour is then made more serious because monitoring and evaluation of IC projects has often been weak due to the lack of adequate instruments and methodologies.

24. These issues have now been recognized and steps are being taken to resolve them: the quality of IC programmes was a major focus of attention at the November 1986 DAC meeting on technical co-operation. The tentative conclusions of that meeting are being further elaborated and will provide guidelines for improving the IC process among the donor community. The same issues arose in the criticisms of IC expressed by the African Ministers of Planning in the UNDP-sponsored Cluster Meetings. At the October 1987 DSE and DAC/UECD round-table meeting on technical co-operation, similar views were expressed. Specific areas cited as requiring more work were evaluation methodologies, training and increasing donor sensitivity and appreciation of socio-political and cultural issues.

B. Donor interests

25. Besides the concerns about the quality of IC programmes, there are aspects of donor policies that can lead to supply driven IC, that is, IC programmes motivated by the special interests of donors and not by the mutually agreed needs of recipients. As noted above, priority may be given to ensuring the successful physical implementation of development projects by employing nationals of the donor country. This may be because of (a) a fear of misuse of funds if there is not an external adviser or project manager control of project expenditures; (b) a concern that local technical capacities are not strong enough to deal with complex issues especially in locating and technology transfer; (c) a desire on the part of the donor to have an insider well placed within a recipient country to pursue the donor's broader political and economic concerns; or (d) the convenience of having someone on site with whom to communicate easily and to act as an interface with local administrations on a day-to-day basis. It should be noted, however, that donors are often advocating change through IC programmes and that this change may be resisted.

26. To the extent that IC is, in fact, supply driven, this obviously leads to duplication among donors and use of foreign consultants/advisers where local staff may be adequate for the assignment. Moreover, IC funds especially from bilateral sources are often tied and the availability of financing for personnel of the donor country can mean that capable Africans are bypassed in favour of donor nationals.

C. Recipient constraints

27. The demand by recipient countries for IC can be motivated by their own particular interests and constraints. Officials may turn to foreigners in place of their own nationals and other Africans for a variety of political and even personal reasons: the supposed objectivity of foreign advisers can enhance their effectiveness and acceptability in some complex socio-political settings as they

may be seen as more discrete or particularly sensitive policy issues. This may be particularly true if conflict of interest could arise with nationals involved. Personal gain from dealing with foreign consulting firms may be another factor that reduces the share of IC programmes going to local consultants. Some recipients, like donors, also see foreign advisers as an easy way of communicating with donors: foreigners can act as an interpreter and facilitator on behalf of the recipients and handle directly with donors many issues that arise during the course of project implementation. The issues of cross-cultural management mean that it may simply be easier for both donors and recipients to have a third party function as an intermediary.

25. The attraction of foreign advisers is further enhanced if these advisers are well equipped with vehicles, computers and office equipment and supplies. Given the scarcity of operating funds - the greater part of public operating expenditures is often used to pay for salaries - the availability of these facilities makes IC much more appealing to recipients. However, a key issue, too often ignored by both donors and recipients, is how recurrent costs related to the activities set in motion by IC will be defrayed after donor involvement in project operations is terminated. The need for a joint and realistic assessment of the recipient's ability to meet the recurrent costs over time, and for including IC in the recipient government's planning and budgetary processes to ensure sustainability, is increasingly called for by all parties who expect effective utilization of IC and require an acceptable return on investment.

26. Finally, there is a more fundamental dilemma faced in many African governments. The pay scales and working conditions in the public sector are often so poor that competent local staff are not attracted to the positions. Only by securing financing from donors to engage foreign advisers or perhaps for topping up salaries and providing other benefits for nationals working on the project can African managers hope to have the expertise needed to get done the tremendously important jobs assigned to them. In the short run, it may be easier for governments to engage foreigners than it is for them to develop a compensation policy that offers adequate incentive for skilled and experienced local staff. IC may, in fact, be desirable supplementary support for selected, routine functions of government operations.

27. Not only are competent Africans not attracted to the civil service, the so-called counterparts to the foreign advisers - who are to be trained to take over the job at the end of the project - may be so poorly equipped and/or motivated that there is very little chance that any transfer of knowledge will take place. The keen counterparts who do learn from the project are then unlikely to stay in the public sector, undermining the sustainability of whatever was initially achieved.

28. Making IC more effective and enhance the sustainability of these operations requires public sector reform to overcome the serious problems of incentives and public finances within outdated and inefficient civil service structures. Overall, because of serious systemic deficiencies in management structures and processes, effective on-the-job training of counterparts is

hampered and much institution building will continue to be ineffective as long as these deficiencies in the public sector persist.

32. During the cluster meetings of the African Ministers of Planning, the participants clearly expressed some of the main criticisms that are levelled at technical co-operation:

(a) Even though technical co-operation has been provided to African Governments for several decades, its impact in terms of lasting capacity of national institutions has been markedly insufficient;

(b) Within African Governments the structures in charge of co-ordinating and managing technical co-operation are usually weak and insufficiently staffed;

(c) As a result of the situation described above, planning, programming and implementation of technical co-operation is donor-driven. Recipient governments tend to accept it at times as the price to pay to receive capital aid or as a means to finance their own recurrent budgets through ID projects. Duplications and redundancies of technical assistance are a direct consequence of this lack of government co-ordination and programming;

(d) Technical co-operation is extremely costly. The remuneration of an expatriate expert may be a multiple by 100 or more of his counterpart's salary. As a result, the total cost of technical co-operation is, in the case of certain African countries, comparable to the wage bill of the whole public sector even though the number of expatriate experts is only a fraction of the number of civil servants. In addition, technical co-operation has hidden costs for the recipient country (for instance counterpart staff, housing, transport) which can add up to a significant percentage of the recipient government's budget;

(e) Assignment of counterpart staff by recipient governments has proved difficult. Budgetary constraints and freezes on recruitment in the public sector, generally associated with stabilization and adjustment programmes, have contributed to this problem in recent years;

(f) Constraints on recruitment in the public sector have also prevented an adequate staffing of certain key government institutions, in spite of the availability of the qualified nationals and, even of unemployment among the graduates and post-graduates. This, in turn, has led donors to provide expatriate assistance to reinforce these governmental structures, thus leading to a paradoxical situation where technical assistants carry out responsibilities that could be discharged by qualified, unemployed nationals;

(g) Technical co-operation has been provided, as a rule, on a project-by-project basis, without a sectoral or national framework;

(h) Training efforts do not always address the priority needs of the country since these are not systematically identified;

examples cited below are not necessarily all inclusive but reflect major actions underway.

27. In their review of technical co-operation, the African Ministers of Planning in the cluster meetings put forward the following recommendations:

(a) The objectives of technical co-operation projects should be emphasized as being to build locally national capacities in the relevant areas, thus reducing the dependence on the country on foreign assistance.

(b) Technical co-operation programmes should make greater use of national experts, as well as experts from Africa and other developing countries;

(c) UNDP should assist African governments in establishing a data bank on national expertise to plan more effectively the training and use of national human resources.

(d) African consultancy agencies should be strengthened;

(e) The costs of technical co-operation should be reviewed, and should be financed through grants as far as possible;

(f) Reipient governments should have the right, and be provided with the financial means, to interview and appoint candidates for expert posts;

(g) Nationals must be provided with properly defined job descriptions, incentives, training and experience sufficient to ensure that they sustain activities with the same efficiency after the departure of the expatriate experts;

(h) In consultation with governments, UNDP should develop a strategy to stem the deterioration of technical assistance due to increased utilization of young, insufficiently experienced experts;

(i) UNDP should, in co-operation with governments, be reviewing the current distribution of resources between human resources, equipment and materials;

(j) At the completion of a project, equipment and materials should be transferred to the recipient countries, where these projects are located;

(k) The transfer of equipment should be completed as soon as possible and introduced in a systematic way, with immediate training as appropriate;

(l) The next cycle should be so designed and implemented that subsequent cycles can be carried out by recipient governments;

(m) As envisaged, SAARs should be extended at their request to other African countries, irrespective of whether they have adopted a structural

adjustment programme, UNDP should develop and disseminate information on NALAPs to permit cross-fertilization among countries.

(ii) The establishment of a data base technical co-operation should be adequately stressed in the implementation of the NALAP cycle;

(iii) Management systems and structures should be the subject of intensive examination in the NALAP cycle; and

(iv) UNDP should, in the course of NALAP exercises, assist the African countries in establishing or strengthening national structures responsible for programming, managing and monitoring technical co-operation.

4. Technical co-operation planning and organization

12. Two recent programmes to improve policy coordination and planning of IC interventions have come about at the initiative of UNDP, as illustrated below:

(a) UNDP, during 1981, when co-ordination of IC is being improved by recording IC on the agenda of Round-table and consultative group meetings, the latter in collaboration with the World Bank. For World meetings, a separate paper on IC is collected IC will be prepared by UNDP and introduced; and

(b) NALAPs are being undertaken with UNDP assistance for a growing number of countries. A.E., there are measures to assist recipient countries in defining their own policies, priorities and programmes for technical co-operation and in identifying measures needed in strengthening management. As part of the NALAP process, UNDP is working with Governments in the preparation of technical co-operation policy documents. These documents constitute the basic document of a Government's IC policy and objectives and are first presented in the form of a consultative technical co-operation programme (IC) to the donor community at a consultative group or Round-table meeting. Through this process, the consultative group members, as well as donor countries, United Nations specialized agencies and other ICICs, are kept abreast through Sector Reviews and ICICs, which will be held at the donor community building blocks in the IC.

5. Strengthening consulting capacity

13. UNDP, the World Bank and other ICICs are currently collaborating to prepare a programme of support to develop local consulting capacities in Africa. The strengthening of these capacities is expected to facilitate the use of African consultants in development programmes, instead of relying on foreign advisers and consultants. A major feature of this programme is the direct involvement of public and private consulting organizations in the design of the programme. Working through existing associations or encouraging their creation, Africa-wide and nationally, the programme has so far been able to reach a large number of firms and individuals in seven countries. These associations have been instrumental in organizing consultants and could prove to be effective in

established inventories of qualified consultants, ensuring good responses to requests from donors for consulting proposals, and formulating priorities for undertaking consulting assignments. In this way, associations could play an effective role as intermediator for donors to reach African consultants. Donor support is needed for the continuation of the existing programmes in at least seven selected countries as well as for expanding the programmes to other countries.

40. In parallel to developing these local capacities, an additional objective is to alter current donor policies and practices with regard to the eligibility of local consultants to be awarded contracts for consulting services under externally financed development projects. Certain donors, notably the African Development Bank, already have adopted measures to provide an incentive for the selection of African consultants while others have more restrictive policies. To the extent possible, more flexibility would be sought on the part of donors at least to put African consultants on an equal footing in terms of eligibility with nationals of the country providing the services.

D. Capacity for policy analysis and economic management

41. The World Bank, UNCTAD and the Bank for Africa with donors and African governments a specific initiative to build capacity in the area of policy analysis and economic management. One of the objectives of this initiative is to build institutions, at national and regional levels and within governments, that are capable of training policy analysts and managers, advising governments on policy questions and undertaking research on macro-economics and other important public issues, and thus contributing from a cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary perspective. These institutions would also constitute the forum for exchanging views and information among parties in understanding the policy process, especially among the academic community and the private sector. The goal is to reduce the isolation of policy advisers in this important area by greatly enhancing the effectiveness of their work through co-ordinating and rationalizing their efforts, and to provide the kind of concerted and sustained support that is required for these institutions to flourish. By establishing the specific institutional and advisory mechanisms, it is hoped that Africans can play a larger role in defining priorities and policies and in administering various programmes. Interest in this initiative is high and it is anticipated that, over time, the approach could be expanded or replicated in other important areas.

E. Institutionalizing good and improving performance

42. As set out above, the agenda for changing the way in which ID programmes are handled by donors and recipients is large and it will take a considerable period of time to redirect ongoing programmes and to alter existing policies and practices. Habits from the past will not easily or readily be altered in favour of more effective, but perhaps more time-consuming and costly, approaches. Moral suasion on the part of the DAC, through the adoption of the interim conclusions, and multilateral organizations such as UNCTAD and the World Bank, through their leadership in the consultative process with donors, will be

essential. Recipient governments, on their side, must also be vigilant in seeing that donors adhere to the guidelines upon which are approved by donors.

43. For this to take place, commitment efforts are needed in order to ensure that the entire development community is fully informed of IC programmes. This will necessitate an enhanced level of reporting by donors and recipients including the following:

(a) Accurate and comprehensive data plans on the actual level of IC and its composition;

(b) Additional details, in accordance with agreed definitions, on IC programmes to enable analysis of its effectiveness;

(c) Improved methodology and approaches to IC evaluation which can be shared more widely with donors and recipients; and

(d) More frequent exchange of views among IC experts.

44. It must, furthermore, be recommended that the following recommendations could remain at the level of important policy issues and their implementation by donors to certain targets, in particular, in the training sector. Concrete recommendations should be made in order to see that these recommendations are, indeed, translated into effective action. Some specific measures that could be adopted include the following:

(a) The share of long-term resident advisers in total IC programmes should decrease in the coming years in favour of an increase in short-term consultants and/or non-resident advisers who visit the recipient periodically; the target could be fixed at even one-third or one-half of total IC;

(b) The amount of training aid fully provided for in IC programmes (excluding training on-the-job or on-site) should be increased substantially; the target could be set at 25 to 40 per cent of the total;

(c) The share of total IC aid in the form of fellowships should under IC programmes should increase from 20 per cent to 25 to 30 per cent; and

(d) National execution, that is, management of IC programmes directly by the concerned recipient, instead of by the financing donor or a selected executing agency, should be increased. The target level for such execution would vary depending on current donor practice: in the case of UNDP, it would rise from 5 per cent to 10 to 15 per cent; and beyond over time.

V. CONCLUSIONS

45. As the UN-PAAERD comes to a close, it is important for African Governments to pursue the issues and concerns expressed in this document. The actions and initiatives described in the document are positive responses for dealing with, or beginning to deal with, some of these issues. However, these in their own right will not be sufficient unless considerably more emphasis is placed on those areas of weakness: for example, education and training; women both as beneficiaries and partners in IC activities; inclusion of IC in country planning and budgetary processes; consideration of the recurrent costs related to IC projects during the period of donor involvement and after; and analysis of availability of local persons to do required work before deciding on IC with expatriate advisers. All of these steps, moreover, must be placed in the context of strategies aimed at long-term capacity building and policy reform to increase effective utilization of existing human resources in sub-Saharan Africa.

Annex I(a)

GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

Data reporting and monitoring

Rigorous mechanisms should be established with a specific view to assessing the effectiveness of IC, regardless of source.

Evaluation methodologies

Various bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and institutions in consultation with recipient governments should jointly undertake research on developing methodologies and evaluation techniques on IC effectiveness.

Capacity building

To advance more fundamental changes in IC effectiveness, donors should give priority to capacity-building initiatives, particularly those aimed at: (i) increased use of national consultants; (ii) regional management training institutions; and (iii) policy analysis and economic management.

Use of national consultants

Donors should specifically commit themselves to making their financing more fungible and increasing the use of national consultants in their development programmes.

Public sector reform

African Governments, with the support of the donor community, should not relent in their current efforts towards public sector reforms, especially those that address staffing and incentives in the civil service, expenditure management, and overall management improvement.

Technical co-operation planning and programming

The World Bank and UNDP, in particular, should focus on improvement in the programming and budgeting of IC, transparency and consistency on the budgetary implications (especially regarding jointly supplemented) and governmental structures for management of IC programmes (through MARSAPs, etc.); and

Increased consultation

Finally, African Governments and donors should, as soon as possible, enter into dialogue and exchange views on IC; commitment by both donors and recipients is required to effect lasting change. UNDP should take the lead in sponsoring a series of meetings on these issues.

A. View to the future

In the cluster meetings, the African Ministers of Planning concluded that progress is occurring towards having better-focused TC with the donors converging on real needs. The programming of TC has been strengthened and is starting to benefit from NATCAPs and the Technical Co-operation Policy Framework Papers prepared as part of the NATCAP process. The Ministers noted that one of the main objectives of the NATCAPs must be to prepare for the replacement of expatriate technical assistance by nationals within a reasonable period of time. This should bring an end to the continuing dependence of the countries' management on foreign expertise and make room for other forms of development assistance. NATCAPs must therefore stimulate the development of national expertise; it should also encourage South-South and particularly intra-African co-operation.

Appendix
TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Bibliography

Background papers

1. Bank-Financed Technical Assistance for Africa: A Review of the Requirements, Washington, 17 September 1980.
2. Technical Assistance: What the World of view of the donors, DAC 90th May 1980.
3. Economic Cooperation and Development: An Assessment of the Impact of Technical Assistance on the Development of Africa: A Study in the Context of Economic Recovery and Development, Washington, 1980-1981.

Annex 1(c)

TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA

Bibliography

1. United Nations: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1966-1980; A/RES/21-12/2, 19 June 1966.
2. United Nations: Official Economic Situation in Africa: United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1966-1980: Mid-term Review of the Implementation of the UN-PAARD, Report of the Secretary-General; A/43/60, 7 August 1988.
3. United Nations: Res. 2116 (XXI) and 2076 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly: Mid-term Review and Wishes for the Implementation of the UN-PAARD, 1966-1980; 37 January 1984.
4. United Nations: Follow up the implementation of the UN-PAARD 1966-1980; May 1984.
5. United Kingdom evaluation regarding to Overseas Development Administration, Quantifying the Volume of UN-PAARD Co-Operation: A Note on Methodologies, January 1984.
6. UNCTAD: Co-operation in Technical Assistance: Towards Quantitatives, draft by M. de Werra, 1984.
7. UNCTAD: Co-operation in Technical Assistance: Quantitatives, paper presented by M. de Werra, 22-23 March 1984, 22-23 March, 24 February - 1 March 1984.
8. UNCTAD: Improving the effectiveness of Technical Co-operation, UNCTAD Round-table meeting on Technical Co-operation, Addis Ababa, 1984.
9. United Nations: United Nations Development Programme and Programmes (UNDPs): A Status Report, UNCTAD, 1984, 14 December 1984.
10. African Development Bank: Review of the Impact of Technical Assistance on Institutional Development in Africa, World Conference on Technical Assistance in Africa, 27-29 April 1984.
11. UNDP: Human Resources Development: Initiatives, Capacity Building and Technical Co-operation: An Overview of Projects, Needs Assessments and Programmes.
12. World Bank: Building Capacities in Economic Management and Policy Analysis in sub-Saharan Africa, Africa region, The World Bank, 7 December 1988.

13. UNDP: La coopération technique en République Islamique de Mauritanie, UNDP, May 1968.
14. UNDP: Situation et perspectives de l'assistance technique en Guinée-Bissau, UNDP, June 1968. And Première phase diagnostique et programmation nationale de la coopération technique, Nov. 1967.
15. UNDP: L'assistance technique au Rwanda: situation actuelle and perspectives, UNDP, March/April 1968. And Report du 1er séminaire national sur l'assistance technique September 1969.
16. UNDP: The state of technical assistance in Sierra Leone - A Preliminary Study, the Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP, August 1967.
17. UNDP: Ressources humaines nationales et assistance technique nécessaires à l'élaboration et à l'exécution d'un programme d'ajustement structurel du pays: réunion des hauts dirigeants de hauts sur le financement du programme d'ajustement structurel et l'aide aux projets, UNDP, April 1968.
18. UNDP: Restructuring and Development in Zambia: Notes for technical cooperation, Report of the technical technical cooperation Assessment and Programming Mission to Zambia, UNDP, 1967.
19. UNDP: Summary Report of a Joint Technical Cooperation Assessment Mission, UNDP, October 1967.
20. UNDP: National Technical Cooperation Assessment and Programme Principles and Procedures, January 1968.
21. UNDP: Evaluation de l'assistance technique au Rwanda and technical cooperation in Rwanda, UNDP, 1968.
22. UNDP: Analyse de l'assistance technique en République de Bénin, Janvier 1968.
23. UNDP: Development Technical Cooperation in the United Republic of Tanzania: Consultative Group Meeting for Tanzania, July 1968.
24. Federal Republic of Canada: Ministry of Finance: Learning from Mistakes: Nine years of evaluating Project Assistance, findings and conclusions, May 1968.
25. UNDP: Government Monitoring and evaluation systems: what are the questions? April 1967.
26. NORDIC Countries: Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Technical Assistance Personnel, March 1968.

27. UNDP: Special Action Programme in Administration and Management for Africa (SAPAM), Report of the Secretary-General, S/50/AC-6/1989/L4, 14-23 March 1989.
28. UNDP: Technical Co-operation: Its Evaluation and some issues for discussion, 18 May 1988.
29. UNDP: Revised UNDP Development Co-operation Report, August 1988.
30. Kicher, Carl K.: Sustainable Institutions for African Agricultural Development, December 1988.
31. UNDP: Status Report, Regional Programme for Africa, Fourth Programming Cycle, 1987/1991: June 1988.
32. USAID: Summary of the SACIT Reports for 1987-89, 1988.
33. IFEIA: African Education and Access to Modern Knowledge in 'A world to make development in perspective', in DATADIAS, Winter, 1989.
34. Uwajembi: Education Relevant to People's Needs in 'A world to make development in perspective', in DATADIAS, Winter, 1989.
35. UNDP: Diagnostic et programmation nationale de la coopération technique (N-16A), Juin-août, November 1987.
36. ILISI Foundation: African Academy of Sciences and the United States National Academy of Sciences: Scientific Institution Building in Africa: March 1988.
37. UNDP: Orientation and Areas of Concentration for the Regional Programme for Africa during the Fourth Programming Cycle (1987-1991).
38. Mutnarika, Binauwa: The Contribution of Subregional Institutions Towards Intra-African Trade, Economic Recovery and Development: ECA, June 1987.
39. van Reenen, Bert-Jan and Waalwijk, Eric: Final report on Institutional Development: The Hague, April 1988.
40. Hanna, Nady, World Bank: Strategic Planning and Management: A Review of Recent Experience, No. 751, 1988.
41. North, W. Haven: USAID U. S. Assistance to African Science and Technology: Contributions and Issues in Institution Building, May 1988.
42. Sutton, Francis X.: Building Competences for Policy Analysis and Management in Developing Countries: Asian and Latin American Experience with Relevance for Africa: June 1987.

43. OECD: Development Co-operation: Strorts and Policies for the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Paris 1988.
44. OECD: Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Paris 1988.
45. Knoppers, Lauren, The Winding of Institutions: Its Use as a Technical Assistance Delivery System, World Bank Technical Paper No. 23.
46. Paul, Samuel, Training for Public Administration and Management in Developing Countries. A Review, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 584, 1983.
47. UNCTAD, Women as Agents and Beneficiaries in Development Projects, Paris, 1983.
48. UNCTAD, Sustainability in Development Programmes: A Compendium of Evaluation Experiences, Paris, 1988.
49. Wimmerman, Jerry, Technical Assistance and Aid Agency Staff, Alternative Techniques for Greater Effectiveness, World Bank Technical Paper No. 28, 1984.
50. World Bank, World Development Report 1985.
51. OECD, Geographical Distributions of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1954/1987.
52. USAID, Congressional Presentation: Fiscal Year 1990, Annex I Africa.
53. Scudder, Thayer, The African Experience with River Basin Development, Executive Summary and Recommendations, Institute for Development Anthropology and Clark University, June 1988.
54. Anlborg, Hans and Lovrsek, Asaphro, UNDP in Action: A study on UNDP Field Offices in Selected Countries in Africa and Asia, UNRISD-Department, 1985.
55. Cassen, Rupert and Associates, Debt Aid work: Chapter VI Technical Co-operation, 1985.

Table 1

Parto A

Table I: (continued)

Country/Year	Total t/ha	1984 t/ha	1985 t/ha	% change
Burkina Faso				
1984	207.2	177.2	197.0	97.63
1985	201.0	188.0	211.0	112.27
1987	181.3	167.0	197.0	118.57
Burundi				
1984	12.9	1.0	18.4	8.11
1985	21.6	1.0	27.8	13.39
1987	11.0	38.0	11.1	-1.09
Cambodia				
1984	1.8	1.0	1.0	0.00
1985	143.4	1.0	21.1	11.61
1987	100.4	1.0	29.1	18.89
Chad				
1984	25.1	12.1	12.1	48.16
1985	30.1	10.1	21.1	41.17
1987	10.1	20.1	11.1	11.81
Chile				
1984	12.2	10.1	11.1	78.40
1985	12.1	10.1	11.1	10.11
1987	10.1	11.1	11.1	11.81
Egypt				
1984	10.1	10.1	11.1	10.11
1985	11.1	11.1	11.1	11.11
1987	10.1	11.1	11.1	11.11
Ethiopia				
1984	10.1	10.1	11.1	10.11
1985	11.1	11.1	11.1	11.11
1987	10.1	11.1	11.1	11.11
Ghana				
1984	10.1	10.1	11.1	10.11
1985	11.1	11.1	11.1	11.11
1987	10.1	11.1	11.1	11.11
Guinea				
1984	10.1	10.1	11.1	10.11
1985	11.1	11.1	11.1	11.11
1987	10.1	11.1	11.1	11.11

Source: OECD Geographical Distribution of Farm Land (Paris 1984/85) world
Book: WIR 1988

Table II: Some economic indicators and technical cooperation in Africa

Country/year	GNI \$ million	Total \$ GNI	Population million	TC per capita \$	TC per capita \$
ANGOLA					
1984	2,110	0.29	2.04		2.76
1985	2,140	0.29	2.09		2.76
1987					
BENIN					
1984	540	1.42	2.82		1.17
1985	1,580	1.78	4.18	210	3.12
1987	1,420	2.21	4.30		21.41
BURUNDI					
1984	470	2.00	1.92		13.10
1985	980	2.12	2.11	240	19.28
1987	1,020	2.30	2.12		20.18
BURKINA FASO					
1984	1,000	1.12	1.82		1.20
1985	1,020	2.00	2.10	150	11.81
1987	1,350	2.12	2.30		11.93
BURUNDI					
1984	970	2.40	2.80		8.34
1985	1,200	2.48	2.84	240	11.10
1987	1,150	3.24	2.90		10.20
CAMEROON					
1984	7,070	0.84	0.87		0.07
1985	10,350	0.84	10.52	250	8.69
1987	12,190	0.84	10.90		8.11
CAPE VERDE					
1984	130	12.08	0.12		10.13
1985	160	10.24	0.14	460	10.13
1987	100	10.24	0.10		10.30
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.					
1984	0.00	0.92	2.32		13.20
1985	0.00	1.87	2.60	250	13.20
1987	1,000	1.61	2.30		13.19

Table II: (continued)

Country/year	GNP \$ million	Total \$ GNP	Population million	GNP per capita \$	Tt per capita \$
CHAD					
1984	310	5,400	4,30		3,84
1985	810	5,68	4,33	399	8,94
1987	46	6,10	5,30		9,77
COMOROS					
1984	110	8,55	0,14		21,41
1985	160	8,50	0,15	320	28,67
1987	200	2,70	0,30		48,50
CONGO					
1984	2,070	1,60	1,82		18,95
1985	1,620	2,16	1,54	980	19,83
1987	1,890	2,36	2,03		24,20
CÔTE D'IVOIRE					
1984	2,070	0,97	5,90		3,95
1985	8,660	1,01	10,70	150	8,14
1987	9,130	0,83	11,10		7,10
EQUATORIAL GUINEA					
1984			0,57		10,31
1985			0,48		20,41
1987			0,10		16,50
ETHIOPIA					
1984	4,810	1,68	42,13		4,92
1985	5,400	2,22	43,50	120	2,96
1987	5,950	2,01	44,80		3,27
GABON					
1984	3,190	0,51	0,25		41,57
1985	3,010	1,10	1,04	3,080	51,74
1987	3,090	1,30	1,09		50,90
The GAMBIA					
1984	200	7,40	0,72		20,47
1985	170	19,12	0,75	230	12,10
1987	210	10,19	0,80		20,73
GHANA					
1984	4,550	0,58	12,31		2,08
1985	5,590	0,70	13,13	390	2,37
1987	1,940	0,93	13,60		3,36

Table II: (continued)

Country/year	GDP million	1984 \$/GDP	Per capita \$/GDP	GDP per capita \$	1984 \$/GDP
GUYANA					
1984	1,810	0.97	0.02		2.00
1985	1,800	0.96	0.02	1.90	1.90
1986	2,060	1.00	0.02		2.00
GUATEMALA					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
HAITI					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
INDONESIA					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
IRAN (Islamic Rep.)					
1984	2,240	1.00	0.02		2.00
1985	2,240	1.00	0.02	2.00	2.00
1986	2,240	1.00	0.02		2.00
IRAQ					
1984	1,100	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,100	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,100	0.98	0.02		2.00
ITALY					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
JAMAICA					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
JAPAN					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
NETHERLANDS					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
NETHERLANDS (Antilles)					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
NEW ZEALAND					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
NORWAY					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
PARAGUAY					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
PERU					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
RUSSIA (incl. USSR)					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
SAUDI ARABIA					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
SEYCHELLES					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
SIERRA LEONE					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
SINGAPORE					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
SPAIN					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
SWEDEN					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
SWITZERLAND					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
TAIWAN					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
THAILAND					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
TURKEY					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
UNITED KINGDOM					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
UNITED STATES					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
YUGOSLAVIA					
1984	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00
1985	1,000	0.98	0.02	1.90	2.00
1986	1,000	0.98	0.02		2.00

Table II: (continued)

Country/year	GDP \$ million	Total \$ B.	Debt/total million	Net IDA \$ B.	Net IDA \$ B.
Malawi					
1983	1,050.0	1,050.0	1,050.0		1,050.0
1985	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
1987	1,400.0	1,400.0	1,400.0		1,400.0
Mali					
1983	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0		1,000.0
1985	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
1987	1,400.0	1,400.0	1,400.0		1,400.0
Morocco					
1983	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0		1,000.0
1985	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
1987	1,400.0	1,400.0	1,400.0		1,400.0
Niger					
1983	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0		1,000.0
1985	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
1987	1,400.0	1,400.0	1,400.0		1,400.0
Nigeria					
1983	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0		1,000.0
1985	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
1987	1,400.0	1,400.0	1,400.0		1,400.0
Senegal					
1983	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0		1,000.0
1985	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
1987	1,400.0	1,400.0	1,400.0		1,400.0
Seychelles					
1983	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0		1,000.0
1985	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
1987	1,400.0	1,400.0	1,400.0		1,400.0
Sierra Leone					
1983	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0		1,000.0
1985	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
1987	1,400.0	1,400.0	1,400.0		1,400.0
South Africa					
1983	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0		1,000.0
1985	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
1987	1,400.0	1,400.0	1,400.0		1,400.0

Table II: (continued)

Country/year	GNP \$ million	GNP % GNP	Population million	GNP per capita \$	GNP per capita %
Thailand	1984	10,000	41.80	215.00	1.73
	1985	10,000	41.80	215.00	1.73
	1987	10,000	41.80	215.00	1.73
Swaziland	1984	10,000	1.00	10,000	10.00
	1985	10,000	1.00	10,000	10.00
	1987	10,000	1.00	10,000	10.00
Tanzania	1984	10,000	20.00	500.00	4.00
	1985	10,000	20.00	500.00	4.00
	1987	10,000	20.00	500.00	4.00
Togo	1984	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1985	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1987	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
Togo	1984	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1985	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1987	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
Togo	1984	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1985	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1987	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
Togo	1984	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1985	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1987	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
Togo	1984	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1985	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1987	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
Togo	1984	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1985	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1987	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
Togo	1984	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1985	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00
	1987	10,000	4.00	2,500.00	20.00

Source: UNDP Geographical Distribution of International Income 1984/85;
World Bank: WDI 1988.

Annex III

PRINCIPLES FOR TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

The UNDP Concept and Studies Committee, established in November 1967, reviewed the UNDP and UNCTAD work in technical co-operation in the 1960s with a focus on technical co-operation management and co-ordination and on policies on personnel and delivery modes. The following note reflects the preliminary conclusions of this exercise. A Summer on Technical Co-operation to be organized by the German Development Foundation in Berlin in October 1969 will provide an opportunity to define more fully the views of technical assistance managers from developing countries. The UNCTAD will pursue its work on technical co-operation principles in 1970. Matters to be explored further include criteria for entry supplementation, the role of technical co-operation as an integral part of sector assistance and improved co-ordination of technical assistance, including the role of UNDP in this regard.

PRINCIPLES FOR TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

1. Technical co-operation is an integral element of development co-operation. Considerable resources are being committed for this purpose by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. It is estimated that 10 per cent were allocated to technical co-operation in 1967, up from 5 per cent in 1960. Developing countries increasingly recognize the importance of technical co-operation and increase still further in the future. This will require a high degree of adaptability and creativity as well as new efforts towards new tasks in order to cope with the multiplicity of situations in which it is required.

2. Since there is no clear-cut distinction between free-standing technical co-operation and technical co-operation integrated in various projects and (a) respectively in various fields of development - both terms are, in practice, used interchangeably and the term co-operation was used during the past few years to cover both types.

3. The UNCTAD recently adopted guidelines for Project Appraisal, covering the whole process from identification of projects to preparation, appraisal, selection and design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. While these principles apply primarily to development projects, members agreed to consider the applicability of relevant provisions to technical co-operation projects. References will be made to the Technical Appraisal Guidelines (E/CN.4/DM.16/P) of particular relevance.

2. Technical co-operation types

4. Successful development presupposes the existence of institutional capacities. The responsibility for development projects - and therefore for

their preparation and implementation is goes with the developing economic/technical cooperation plans of industrializing countries to strengthen their human and institutional capacities in order to achieve self-reliance and sustainable development. It is emphasizing the human and technical cooperation by improving the prerequisites to their application. Although the importance of human and institutional development has been reaffirmed repeatedly, more needs to be done by donors and recipients together to address this central objective more effectively.

2. Each national or local situation is unique and generalizations must be handled with care, but some major trends concerning its objectives emerge:

(a) The development of institutional capacity and individual capacities is a major objective. More emphasis should be given to institution-building and to the institutional framework of projects and programmes and the nature of activities. This implies an assessment of the implementing or operating agency's capacity to execute a project effectively, as well as an assessment of the institutional environment in which the project is operated. This aspect has been given particular prominence in the ECA and UNCTAD action on institutional development¹;

(b) Human resources development is a worldwide and ongoing activity as well as to successful and lasting and diverse projects, education and training at all levels and key areas for future growth;

(c) Long-term national objectives should take priority over short-term specific project goals. In some cases, however, short-term operational objectives, such as direct support and transfer of technology, can be important;

(d) In the years ahead, one of the major challenges will be to maintain and enhance the management capabilities of economic development. An efficient public sector is vital for development. It is to play a need for it to help governments implement of future development programmes;

(e) Technical co-operation should be aimed at strengthening private sector management since effective involvement of the private sector is essential to the development process; and

(f) More attention should be given to women, both as beneficiaries and partners in IC activities.

11. Technical Co-operation Development

5. The development of national technical and managerial capacities should form an integral part of the recipient's development planning process. Full involvement of recipient governments when planning and programming is therefore necessary. Every effort should be made to utilize internal resources, and external if should follow the least cost principle. A long-term perspective of co-operation is essential. Conditions/problems vary according

It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report.

The information in the above report was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report.

The information in the above report was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report.

The information in the above report was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report.

The information in the above report was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report.

CONFIDENTIAL

The information in the above report was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report. It is noted that the above information was obtained from the same source as the information in the previous report.

9. This implies:

(a) The counterpart issue should be tackled at the level of structures and institutions rather than of individuals. When counterparts are appointed, every effort should be made to ensure their early availability and high quality and the efficient and continued use of them in the positions for which they were trained;

(b) Since the main objective of this institution-building, the provision of expatriate technical assistance personnel for mainly project management purposes should be avoided wherever the host-country personnel situation permits. Recipient governments should be informed of various options in order for them to choose the most advantageous one, when there are special donor conditions, they should be openly acknowledged and the reasons spelled out for transparency;

(c) Donors are invited to make greater use of local experts and consultants, especially when activities require a deep understanding of national and cultural factors. This could be fostered by better information on available local experts, flexibility in recruitment of experts and in the procurement of goods and services, decentralization of authority to the staff, and measures to encourage foreign consultancy firms to work with local consultancy firms;

(d) Government-supported volunteer programmes have made important contributions and still have a role to play depending on the level of development in the recipient country. They can also foster international networks which youth and other groups committed to development, while traditional volunteer programmes are important, there are certain limitations to their scope since they involve and relatively young people with limited professional experience. Such volunteer programmes have an increasingly important role to play, especially in private sector development;

(e) Donors should consider alternative ways of mobilizing funds, for instance, non-governmental organizations, local and international institutions and private sector organizations, not least where national governments have difficulties in providing adequate human and financial counterpart resources. NGOs provide important links to people at the grassroots level, whose involvement is essential for successful and sustainable development. It is likely that in the future the role of the private sector, whether funded by a donor or on a commercial basis, will be much larger. Donors should extend appropriate support for the proper management of these activities;

(f) Twinning arrangements have proved useful in achieving institutional development and transferring skills. Such arrangements may be promoted between various kinds of institutions, provided there is a match of goals and tasks, flexibility to meet changing needs, long-term commitment, mutual trust, and a willingness to adjust to local circumstances;

(g) Donors should consider recruiting nationals from other developing countries in their IC programmes and promoting IC among developing countries (ICUL). Providing recipients with funds for direct hiring of expertise has shown promising results;

(h) The efficiency of IC personnel could be enhanced through more careful and flexible recruitment, better preparation, improved technical back-stopping from headquarters and, above all, clear terms of reference (TORs). The TORs should be jointly defined with recipient authorities. They should outline, in detail, the long-term objectives and the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved, establish a time schedule, and, in the case of long-term contracts, be periodically reviewed with the recipient. Equally important is bringing expertise on the local socio-economic, cultural, political and institutional conditions.

IV. Co-ordination

(i) In line with the 1986 UN Principles for IC co-ordination, central responsibility for the co-ordination lies with each recipient government. There should be more effective and operational co-ordination of IC between recipient governments and donors at policy and operational levels to determine priorities and to decide on a division of roles and responsibilities between the parties concerned. This may reduce some competition for scarce counterpart resources and contribute to optimal resource use. Increased co-ordination should provide a basis for more harmonized procedures.

(j) This implies:

(a) Strengthened the government's capacity to plan and co-ordinate IC. The central ministry should always be involved in co-ordination and line ministries whenever relevant;

(b) Closer co-ordination among donors at field level, particularly in sector and subsectoral co-operation. There is a need for more co-ordination at the central country programming level. Donors should expand co-operation on thematic issues, such as women in development. IC commitments should be based on full information on what other donors are providing and on local expertise available. Donors may co-operate in making inventories of available local expertise;

(c) Technical co-operation needs and priorities as well as requirements for the development of effective recipient country management should be specified and discussed at consultative group/found-table meetings. Efforts should be made to associate NGO and private sector representatives involved in IC activities with local level IC co-ordination meetings;

(d) The multilateral agencies, particularly UNDP and the World Bank, have a special role to play in ensuring co-ordination and harmonization of donor IC practices at field level; and

(e) Co-ordination may include sharing evaluation and other major reports, undertaking joint evaluations and participating in the evaluation work of other donors.